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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF '"UTAH

WALTER W. KERSHAW

:
Plaintiff-Appellant

vs,

:
:

TRACY COLLINS 'BANK & TRUST COMPANY
Administrator of the Estate of
HALLIE LOVE DENNIS, also known as
MRS. CHARLES F. DENNIS

Gasp N

!,?8641!

:

Defendant-Respondent

BRIEF OF APPELLA NT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This 1 s an action bruuyliL I) plain Li i i -npjie i idnt, W.nter U« Korsiuiw
against defendant-respondent9 Tracy Collins Bank & Trust Company, as Administrators
n1" Hit1 csfiil'p ill Hal I u1 ininyr Dennis, I'n HTHVIM' |UHl»Mii(inf* as satisfaction of a
claim brought against the estate of Hallie Love Dennis for services rendered
to the said Hallie Love Dennis by plaintiff during the last three years of
her luie.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Hear. _• was held on January 30, 1976 before the Honorable James W.
Sawaya, sitting without jury on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
defendant seeking to dismiss plaintiff1s Complaint with prejudice.

The Court determined that there was no genuine issue as to any
material fact and granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing
plaintiff1s Complaint with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment rendered in the hearing
below on respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, a determination that
appellant's claim against the estate of Hallie Love Dennis is legitimate and
must be satisfied from the assets thereof, and that the case be remanded with
instructions to determine the value of services rendered deceased.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent's late husband, Earl Dennis, shortly before his death,
requested appellant to look after and take care of Hallie Love Dennis until her
death.

Responding to that request, appellant rendered services to Hallie Love

Dennis on a nearly daily basis during the last three years of her life. During
that period of time, Hallie Love Dennis requested and demanded that appellant
perform numerous services to her, including the maintenance and supervision of
her estate and affairs and the performance of numerous errands.
Hallie Love Dennis during this period of time, not only permitted, but
requested and demanded all of the services which were rendered to her by appellant,
but never entered a contract with appellant, written or oral, for compensation.
Upon the death of Hallie Love Dennis, appellant filed a claim against
her estate for 2,345 hours time spent over a three-year period at $2 per hour
and 20,925 miles traveled at 12/6 per mile. Appellant's claim was for services
rendered covering the preservation of the estate as well as the personal care,
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maintenance and supervision of Hallie Love Dennis1 affairs. Such claim was
rejected by the executor of the estate on May 9, 1975.
Appellant then filed action against respondent in June, 1975.
Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 16, 1976 which was
granted January 30th.
From the foregoing Statement of Facts the appellant respectfully
submits his argument as follows:
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A CLAIM MAY BE ENFORCED AGAINST A DECEASED1 S
ESTATE FOR SERVICES RENDERED TO DECEASED PRIOR TO
DEATH IN THE ABSENCE OF AN ACTUAL CONTRACT
To prevent unjust enrichment in the situation where services are
rendered to one person in the absence of a formal contract, either written or
oral, the courts have imposed a duty to pay for services accepted on the basis
of quantxim meruit.

Recovering on quantum meruit is based upon a benefit accepted

or derived for which the law implies a contract to pay.
149 (Cal. 1949).

Roane vs. Crow, 209 P.2d

By such there is created an implied contract to pay for services

rendered an amount which the one reasonably performing deserves for his labor.
Basing a claim upon quantum meruit brings the action under a class of
obligations imposed by law without regard to the intention or the assent of the
parties to be bound.

This is done for reasons dictated by reason and justice.

Carpenter vs. Josey Oil Company, ( C C A . Okl.), 26 F.2d 442 (1928).
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The deceased in the instant case during a period of nearly three
years requested, on a daily basis, that the appellant render services to her
of a personal nature* At page 13 of appellant's deposition the following
conversation took place:
Q
You said that Earl Dennis had charged you with the
responsibility of taking care of Hallie, is that correct?
A

That's correct*

Q

How had he done that?

A
Because he called me over on New Year's Day, January
1st, 1972, to tell me what bad shape he was in physically,
and he had only a few days to live. And Hallie didn't realize
it. And he had to have somebody to look after her until she
died.
After being so charged and receiving this request of the deceased's
husband, appellant was continuously requested to render services by deceased
herself. Appellant's deposition at page 12 states:
Q
And in your claim you say, "together with all of the
care and maintenance of Hallie Dennis.11
A

With the exception—

Q
And now, you have said that this regards, maybe some of
the supervision of these other people, is that right?
A
Well, I was with her every day, and she was a gal that—
well, let's just put the cards on the table. She was the most
demanding, cantankerous bitch that God ever created, and she knew
that her husband, Earl Dennis, had charged me with the responsibility
of taking care of her before her death. And she went out of her
way to make it miserable with her demands. She'd call four or five
times a day and demand that I go do this, and that, and I'd tell
her, lfhire a taxicab." ,fWell, they charge too much money.f!
And now, she never bought one nickel's worth of groceries.
She didn't go to a doctor, or clinic, or talk to anybody. She
didn't do one single thing that she didn't demand I perform that
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service for her.
Q

Did you take her to the doctors or clinics?

A

I took her every place she went.

Q

Did you take her to the grocery store?

A
No, she sent me to the grocery, and I bought every
single grocery she consumed from the time her husband died
until the time she died. She never went to the grocery store
once.
Further evidence of service rendered is fpund on page 11 of
appellant1s deposition:
Q

Did you hire the nurses?

A

I did.

Q

What are their names?

A
Well, I'll give you those. Dorothy Frickey, an experienced
Practical Nurse who resides at 1249 Glendale Drive. Her telephone
number is 486-8243. She was employed by me on August the 27th
for $100 a week on a seven day, 24 hour basis to take care of
Mrs. Dennis, and she was acceptable to th£ doctors.
Q

Were there other nurses?

A
Yes. She couldn't stand the pressure, and Mrs. Dennis
was too demanding for her to continue, and so she resigned some
time in December. And I was successful to secure the services
of an Adelia Ballaine, 1480 Green Street, telephone number
487-9419, who worked for $85 a week, 24 hours a day, seven
days a week until three weeks before Hallie Dennis died.
Regarding the amount of time in appellant's claim against the estate
his deposition at page 15 reveals:
Q
All right. And now, if you spent 14 hours a week, this
would be averaging then two hours a day. What would you do
during those two hours a day at her house?
A

Well, I had to go to the grocery store once or twice, or
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three times a day to satisfy this woman. And every errand
that she wanted I had to do. I took care of paying all of her
bills, her correspondence. Everything she did. And now, it
did average more than two hours a day during that year,
Q
How about the other eight weeks that you don't claim
for here?
A

I wasnft in town.

Q

Who helped her during that time, do you know?

I can't claim it. I wasn't in town.

A
Yes, I know. She got her neighbors, and she got: this
Claudia Wright thatfs named in the deal.
From the foregoingit is clear that appellant:
1. Was requested by deceased's husband to look after her;
2. Was not, therefore, a volunteer or relative, acting by
love, affection or self seeking;
3. Was continuously requested by decedent to render services
to her; and
4.

Rendered services ordinarily subject to remuneration.

That these services were to be compensated and appellant was not just a volunteer
is found at pages 14 and 49:
Q
And now, on the schedule that you have attached to the
claim you have this broken down as to the three and a portion
of the fourth year that were involved. That is, 1972, 73, 74,
and five weeks of 75. And you say in each instance that you
worked so many hours.
A
She consumed
much time.

that much time of mine. At least that

Q
That you really believe that you were working, and not
performing any kind of a friendly service?
A

No love or friendship involved in this transaction.

Q
You didn't believe that you were doing any kind of a friendly
act or charitable deed?
A
Well, I'm not going to be that—I felt that I was doing what
I was required to do, what I was requested to do. It wasn't a
pleasant job.
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Then at page 49 the following:
Q
And you definitely did not think of your services,
whatever you did for Hallie Dennis, as what, maybe, any other fellow
Mason would do for another Mason1s widow, right?
A

No.

Q
You definitely felt this was not a charitable deed that
any other churchman would do?
A

No. Nobody else would do it, not tor her.

Q
So you were looking at this entirely as something that
you were entitled to pay for?
A
I'm entitled to compensation for the services rendered to
that woman, and the preservation of this estate.
In Kramer vs. Clark, 121 Wash. 507, 209 P. 688, (1922), an action
was brought against the Administrator of an estate seeking to recover money for
services rendered.

The claim was based upon a service rendered by a deceased's

stepson who had made a trip at the special request of decedent to her residence,
resided with her approximately one week and returned home. No express promise
to reimburse the stepson for his trip was found by the court; but nevertheless
the court found that since the decedent had telegrammed her stepson to come to
Seattle, his following her request rendered her estate liable to pay for such trip.
In the instant case there is no relationship of stepmother-stepson
and the continuous request of the decedent over a period of years to have appellant
render services to her. Under such circumstances a promise to pay for these valuab!
services, which were rendered with the deceased's knowledge and approval and at her
request, should be enforced.

Enforcement of a promise to pay the reasonable value

of services is implied where one performs for another with the other's knowledge
when the latter expresses no dissent or avails himself of the service, irrespective
of a precedent request. Naegle vs. Miller, 73 Idaho 441, 253 P.2d 233, (1953).
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If one may be held to a duty of payment without request by availing
himself of the benefit of services, one who requests such services certainly
ought to be so bound, and the law in most jurisdictions is in accord.
The basis for such a view is found in that series of cases which hold
that, generally, when services are rendered by one person for another and
voluntarily and knowingly accepted without more, the law will imply a promise to
pay what the services are actually worth.

Gleason vs. Salt Lake City, et al„ 94

Utah 1, 74 P.2d 1225, (1937); Williams vs. Jones, 105 Kan. 257, 182 P. 392 (1919);
Hardung vs. Green, 40 Wash. 2d 595, 255 P.2d 1163, (1952).

This has been extended

to claims against a decedent1s estate.
This rule of law was further explained in McCollumb vs. Clothier, 121 Ut.
311, 241 P.2d 468, (1952), a case relied upon by respondent below, where the court
was confronted with an action brought against a defendant to recover compensation
under implied contract for services rendered and expenses incurred by the plaintiff
in securing bidders for the purchase of machinery and equipment sold by the
defendant. The defendant did institute a foreclosure proceedings in another matter
and had procured judgment. He then asked the trustee in bankruptcy about the
plaintiff, Mr. McCollumb, as to his trustworthiness. After such conversation, he
contacted the plaintiff and asked the plaintiff to go to the premises where the
machinery was and meet two attorneys involved in the purchase of the machinery.
Plaintiff aided them in checking and inventorying the property and discussing the
property with some interested persons.
It was undisputed that the plaintiff had talked to both the attorney, Mr.
Iverson, and to the defendant, Dr. Clothier, concerning his activities. The fact
is that plaintiff's work did react to the benefit of the defendant at request of a
third party, the defendant's attorney. Upon finding of these facts the court said
that the question of the moment was as to the authorization for the work;
-8-

"The rule applicable to the situation is contained in the Restatement
of Agency, Vol. 2 Section 441, 'except where the relationship of
the parties, the triviality of the services, or other circumstances
indicate that the parties have agreed otherwise, it is inferred
that one who requests or permits another to perform services for
him as his agent promises to pay for them1." Id* at 470.
In the instant case, work and labor was performed for thadeceased at
her request, there is no relationship of the parties, triviality of services, or
any other circumstance which would indicate that services rendered were to be
rendered gratuitously.

In fact the nature and extent of the services obviously

takes them beyond the realm of the trivial, and the decedent in the instant
case continuously required the plaintiff to render further services, not just
permitted them to be rendered.
Further, the established rule, under these facts was set forth in
House Estate, Dillenberger vs. Starkweather, 164 Kan. 610, 192 P.2d 179, (1948),
where the court stated at 180:
"The burden was, of course, on appellee to prove her claim. The
decedent received the benefits of services, and they were performed
with his approval. In 34 CT«J75'«9 Executors and Administrators,
Section 452, the established rule is well stated:
f
Ordinarily the fact that services were rendered decedent at his
request or with his approval, raises a presumption that they were
to be paid forunless the conduct, relationship, or situation of
the parties is of such a nature as to rebut the presumption1."
See also Ennis vs. Nusbaum, Adm'r, 90 Kansas 296, 113 P.2d 537.
In the instant case the decedent's husband charged the appellant just
prior to his death that he take care of the decedent during the last years of her
life, manager her affairs, and see that she was taken care of. Had decedent's
husband outlived her, his estate would have been liable for these services
rendered at his request. Startin vs. Madsen, 120 Ut. 631, 237 P.2d 834,(1951).
However, Hallie Love Dennis did not predecease her husband, who had
charged appellant with duty to see after her needs, and therefore, his estate
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went to her. His estate, now held by the deceased, is obliged to pay for these
services.

In Startin, supra, the court stated at 836:

"There was no error in allowing the jury to include the value of
services rendered to Priscilla Madsen, wife of the deceased, since
nothing furnished in this case could be construed to be anything but
necessities, the expense of which her husband1s estate was obliged
to pay."
The instant case has as its issue the validity of a claim for services
rendered to a decedent prior to her death. As such, it is not based upon contract,
Statutory authority that contracts must be proven in writing, therefore, have no
application. The law is consistent in every jurisdiction that an implied contract
to pay the reasonable value of services rendered is created when services are
given with approval and knowledge. When those services are requested, a conclusive obligation to repay for them ought to be created.
POINT II
WHEN SERVICES ARE RENDERED TO A DECEASED PRIOR TO DEATH AND A CLAIM
MADE AGAINST THE DECEASED'S ESTATE, THE CLAIMANT'S BURDEN IS TO SHOW
THAT SERVICES WERE RENDERED AND THE EXTENT OF THOSE SERVICES
In an action for unjust enrichment the measure of damages,tfierethere
is a proper, equitable basis therefore, is the reasonable value of the services
rendered.

Baugh vs. Parley^ 112 Utah 1, 184 P.2d 335, (1947).

Baugh, supra, was

an action to recover the amount of a down payment on the purchase price of real
property which had been owned by the defendant and for damages for breach of
an oral contract by the defendant to sell the real property to the plaintiff.
Speaking merely to the issue of unjust enrishment, the court stated at 337,
"Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits
which in justice and equity belong to another"•
In so holding, the court required that the benefits be sufficient in
the plaintiff and not incidental in the defendant. Hallie Love Dennis, for three
years made daily requests for appellant to perform services for her. Such
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services were not incidental.

When the extent and!nature of these services

are revealed, justice requires their compensation.
What appellant must show is

the extent olf the services. The following

is a series of statements by appellant regarding seirvices rendered: at page 22 of
appellant1s deposition, we find:
Q

Okay. So back to the claim. So your claim for services at $2.00
an hour is your own evaluation of your worth?

A

No, itfs not my own evaluation of worth. I thought that was a token
payment. Hell, common labor gets $6.00 an hour and I rendered a lot
better service than a common laborer.

Q

But if you didn't have any agreement with her then this is for services
rendered to her which she accepted, is that correct?

A

I didnft have any written agreement with her, and she didn't accept
or make any contract agreement with me, anymore than I make when I
employ you as an attorney.

Further, at page 25, the following conversation takes place:
Q

Did you write all checks for her?

A

I think that the bank statement will show that she wrote a very few.
I wouldn't say there was over five checks she ever got released and
paid, that she wrote herself. I wrote all the checks, but she
signed every single check, except three the day before she died.
Because I insisted all the bills be paid before she died. I think
I paid three checks with power of attorney* Remember, I had power
of attorney all of this time.

Again, at page 45, appellant makes the following statements:
Q

Do you have any record in a diary, or a day book, calendar, or any
way of the actual days or times that you spent with Hallie Dennis?

A

No, I don't make an entry every day, every time I spent with
everything. But I spent time with her every day.

Q

Did you spend time there on Sundays?

A

God, my life wasn't my own the last year, trying to satisfy the demand!
and desires. And it's a wonder my wife ever stayed with me that last
year. God, I waan't no good to anybody.
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Q
So that your claim as you set it out is your estimate of
the time that you spent o n —
A

—-That's a minimum time that I spent, each one of those weeks.

Q

And likewise the mileage was a minimum mileage, maybe?

A

Absolutely, minimum mileage.

That these services were valuable in preserving the estate was pointed
out by appellant.
A
Well, letfs turn it around and say if it hadnft been for
Walter Kershaw there wouldn't be one single dime in that estate to
haggle about or administer to. Ifm the one wholly responsible
for having the entire $66,000 of inventory that's filed with the
court. N o w —
Q
Tell me one thing which you did to preserve any one asset
of the estate?
A
I prevented her from deeding that home to the Christian
Scientist Church, for which Tracy-Collins received $34,000 in
cash. She was hellbent on delivering the deed to that property
to the Christian Science Church.
Q
Then she sould have been subject to being taken advantage
of, namely the Christian Scientist Church? Right?
A
That's right. And if I hadn't stepped in and catered to
her and these nurses, and hauled them back and forth, and she'd been
obliged to pay the nurses' services that she actually obtained between
August 27th and April 7th that would have cost more money. The cash
that was on hand when she died, that would have cost at least $25,000.
And I'm the one that preserved that estate, nobody else involved in
the situation.
Now, furthermore, I have been successful in prevailing upon
Doctors Clark and Lindem, in St. Mark's Hospital not to file claim
for the amount of monies due them for the difference between what
she received from Blue Cross and Medicare, and what their charges
were. And those charges are in excess of $6,000.
Q
You're saying that you asked these doctors not to file a
claim?
A
I did. I prevailed upon them. I felt they had enough that—
well, they just sort of agreed with me that they'd overlook filing
the claims. Now, that's the situation. And those claims are in
excess of $6,000.
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In NylUftd ys t mfc$n,

94 Cal. App. 441, 271 Pac. 374, (1928), the

court held that performance for another person of useful services of the type
and character usually charged for, with the other's consent, raised an implied
promise to pay the reasonable value of the services by the person served.
There existed a claim against the estate for services rendered to the deceased
prior to death.

In allowing recovery under implied contract, the court also

pointed out that because it was a cause of action and under an implied promise
to pay reasonable value for services, the action was based upon quantum meruit.
In such instance the court said:
lf

When, upon the trial of the general issue in an action upon a
quantum meruit for services of a domestic character, the
plaintiff offers evidence showing the facts in which the promise
to pay may properly be inferred, and also showing the nature
and extent of the services rendered, the case should be submitted
to the jury, although no witness expresses an opinion as to the
value of the services."
Such holding allows one making a claim against an estate to establish

by testimony the nature of the services rendered, and then allows the judge
or jury to determine the value of those services under the theory of quantum
meruit.

The court finally held that because the services performed for deceased

were extraordinary:
"Just as stated in the case of Young vs. Bruere, 78 Cal. App. 127,
248 P. 301, where one performs for another with the other's
knowledge a useful service of the character usually charged for,
the latter expresses no dissent or avails himself of the services,
a promise to pay a reasonable value of the service is implied.ff
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POINT III

AN ENFORCEABLE CLAIM MAY EXIST AGAINST AN ESTATE FOR
SERVICES RENDERED DECEASED PRIOR TO DEATH, EVEN THOUGH
DEMAND FOR PAYMENT WAS NOT MADE WHEN DECEASED WAS ALIVE.

Appellant, during the period of time he rendered services for the
deceased, Hallie Dennis, did not demand payment from her. Appellant's
deposition, page 50 illustrates:
Q

Did you ever ask her grandson or her granddaughter for any
compensation for anything that you were doing?

A

No, And they couldn't have paid a penny. They1 re both destitute.

Q

Did you ever make any demand to Tracy -Collins Bank as Trustee
for Earl Dennis —

A

No, never.

Q

—before Hallie died?

A

No. No. Frank Dutson and I are very, very good friends, and Frank
knows exactly what I was doing.

However, formal demand upon a deceased prior to death is not necessary
for appellant to recover for services rendered to her. McCaffrey v. Cronin,
140 Cal. App.2d 973, 295 P.2d 587,(1956). In McCaffrey, supra, the court pointed
out that conduct may determine that compensation is due even without communication
to that effect between the parties. The court stated:
"And the case law has established that intention to pay and
expectation of compensation for services rendered may be inferred
from conduct where equity requires it as well as from direct
communications between the parties...The principle was thus stated
in DeRosier v. Vierra, 109 Cal. App.2d 291, 240 P.2d 660, 662:
'When services are rendered by one person from which another
derives a benefit, although there is no express contract or
agreement to pay for the services, there is a "presumption of
law11 which arises from proof of services rendered that the person
enjoying the benefit of the same was bound to pay what they are
reasonably worth. The doctrine of implied contracts has its
foundation in the doctrine of unjust enrichment." id. at 591.
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In the instant case, the rendering of services for three years,
the traveling of 20,925 miles at the deceased's request, and the spending
of 2,345 hours giving the deceased personal care and preserving her estate,
indicate that expectation of compensation was present.
This view has been reiterated in our own jurisdiction.

In Woodridge

v. Wareing, 120 Utah 514, 236 P.2d 341,(1951), the plaintiff and defendant had
entered into a joint endeavor to sell ice-making equipment and had consumated several
sales.

Plaintiff, in the absence of an express contract, brought an action to

recover for services rendered on the doctrine of quantum meruit for the reasonable
value of the services. The court held

that "he who accepts services from him

who unofficiously performs under circumstances justifying the latter in reasonably assuming he would be compensated, must pay the reasonable value thereof." At 34;
The reason

a demand need not be made upon a deceased during life for

the value of services rendered is also set forth in Western Asphalt Company v,
Valle, et al.«

25 Wash.2d 428, 171 P.2d 159,(1946),where the court described in

detail how the presumption for payment arises:
"To recover for work and labor on the theory of implied
contracts to pay therefore, plaintiff must ordinarily show
that the services were rendered under reasonable expectation
of payment therefore by persons sought to be charged, and with
such persons1 knowledge that services were being performed
with such expectation and a promise to pay for services contrary to the parties intention will not be implied, the recipient's
actual belief as to whether the one performing the service is
expecting compensation is immaterial, if recipient as a reasonable
man should have understood that compensation was expected."
Id. at 165, Emphasis mine.
The court, in introducing the reasonable man test, further went on
to indicate that presumption that payment for labor was contemplated arises
where the kind of labor ordinarily subject to remuneration is rendered and
accepted with knowledge and consent, in absence of anything in the parties
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relation to rebut such presumption.
Appellant is not related to the deceased, the services which he
rendered were of the type ordinarily subject to payment and are of such
extreme nature in the amount of time consumed that the recipient's estate
should be charged with payment therefore, especially when the deceased
continuously requested the services.
The same holding is found in O'Shaughnessy vs. Brownlee, 77 S.W.2d
867 (Mo. 1934).

In Brownlee, supra, the court held that recovery may be had

for services rendered a deceased at his request regardless of whether deceased
intended to pay.

The court stated:

11

If a decedent requested some and received the benefit of and
permitted all, the services which were rendered by a neighbor
during an eleven (11) year period, and the deced€int,who was
crippled, stated that he didn't see how he could get along
without such a neighbor, the estate was liable, even though the
decedent did not intend to pay.11
The gift of a ring to appellant by the deceased does not fully
cover the reasonable value of the services rendered and exhibits an intention
on the part of Hallie Love Dennis to pay for those services. Her estate should
be liable for the appellant's claim for the remainder of the reasonable value
of those services. No demand need have been made upon Hallie Love Dennis since
she should have understood as a reasonable person, that compensation was
expected.
CONCLUSION
Reliance below by the defendant upon the fact that plaintiff's
claim must be grounded in contract was ill founded. Authorities in every
jurisdiction have pointed out, and have clearly held, that the reasonable value
of services rendered to a deceased prior to death may be recovered from his
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estate regardless of actual contract. The law of work and labor is in
agreement•
Appellant

rendered extremely valuable services to the deceased

during a three year period at her request. Judgement in the lower court
granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement should be reversed and the
case remanded for hearing on the extent of the services rendered.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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of May, 1976.
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falter R. Ellett,
Attorney for Appellant
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I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief of Appellant was
served on counsel for respondents, James W. Beless, 1011
Walker Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, by mailing
three copies thereof in a postage prepaid envelope on the
20rh day of May, 1976.
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